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ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE PRESENTED A WEAK CASE AT TRIAL, 
As a portion of each of its arguments, the State points out 
that errors such as are claimed in the case at bar would be more 
likely to result in a reversal without the exceptional strength 
of the state's case. This argument is misleading because, while 
the law is clear that it is more difficult to find prejudicial 
error in strong cases, the State's case was not strong. With 
respect to the elements of the crime charged, the State's case is 
based on the testimony of Melva Palmasano, an unreliable witness. 
The record clearly demonstrates that there were a number of 
reasons to doubt the testimony of Ms. Palmasano. Without the 
four prejudicial incidents which were observed by the jury in 
this case, defendant could well have been acquitted. The 
following examples from the transcript of the trial demonstrate 
why without the prejudicial incidents the jury may not have 
believed Ms. Palmasano's testimony. 
Without being approached by officers, Ms. Palmasano 
instigated the alleged transaction with defendant, and asked the 
defendant to supply her with some methamphetamine. Tr. at 195. 
At this time, Ms. Palmasano was facing a 3rd degree felony 
charge for distribution of a controlled substance. Tr. at 195, 
196. Ms. Palmasano used her own money to allegedly purchase the 
marijuana in question. Tr. at 209. Mr. Palmasano admitted 
having had marijuana in her home, and that she was a marijuana 
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user. Tr. at 217, 218. Sheriffs deputies did not conduct a 
search of Ms. Palmasano or her premises prior to the alleged 
transaction. Tr. at 167. The officer monitoring the alleged 
transaction did not hear a drug transaction. Tr. at 151. Ms. 
Palmasano admitted under oath that on another occasion she lied 
to the very officers who were involved in this case. Tr. at 223, 
244. Mrs. Palmasano was paid $2500.00 for her role in this 
transaction. Tr. at 214. Ms. Palmasano's felony charges were 
dismissed as a result of her participation in this incident. 
Based on these facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that 
Ms. Palmasano faked the drug transaction, (the deputies 
monitoring the conversation did not hear a drug transaction,) 
supplied the marijuana from her personal supply (Ms. Palmasano 
admitted having had marijuana in her home,) and accused 
defendant. Considering these weaknesses regarding the State's 
sole witness to the alleged transaction, the characterization by 
the State that this is a strong case is in error. Considering 
these weaknesses, it is highly probable that absent the 
incidences of error the jury could have reached a different 
result. The errors both singly and cumulatively must therefore 
be classified as harmful. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Dunn, as follows: 
. . . . Under the cumulative error doctrine, we will reverse 
only if "the cumulative effect of the several errors 
undermines our confidence. . . that a fair trial was had.11 
Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp. 801 P.2d 920, 928 
(Utah 1990); accord State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1146 
(Utah 1989); State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 1986). 
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850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). Given the weaknesses in the 
State's case, it is very probable that the jury could have 
reached a different result absent the multiplicity of errors. 
II. THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENT CONSTITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
In its brief, the State argues that the statement which the 
prosecutor made in his opening statement regarding bringing drugs 
from California was not error. The State has two bases for this 
argument. The first is that the statement simply set forth what 
the prosecutor believed would be admissible evidence. The 
second is that while defendant objected to the statement by the 
prosecutor, there was no objection to the introduction of the 
actual testimony. Both arguments are in error. 
There is no basis for the argument that the prosecution 
believed that information regarding the purpose of the trip to 
California would be admissible. While it makes sense to tell the 
jury for foundational purposes that the defendant was planning a 
trip to California and needed Ms. Palmasano to cover a shift for 
her, there was no purpose foundational or otherwise to refer to a 
supposed intent on the part of the defendant to purchase illegal 
drugs. The only purpose for this statement is to inflame the 
jury. The State could have laid adequate foundation to put its 
case on without waving these supposed bad acts in front of the 
jury. 
In an opening statement, the prosecutor commits error when 
he refers to matters which are not proper for the jury to 
consider in reaching its verdict. 
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Although we give counsel considerable latitude in making 
arguments to the jury, "counsel exceeds the bounds of this 
discretion and commits error if he or she calls to the 
jury's attention material that the jury would not be 
justified in considering in reaching its verdict." 
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 349 (Utah, 1993). Contrary to the 
State's argument, the statement of the prosecutor was not proper 
for consideration by the jury in making its determinations and 
was, therefore, error. 
The State's argument regarding failure to object to the 
actual testimony about the California trip is also incorrect. 
When the prosecution first mentioned the California trip during 
opening statement, defense counsel properly objected. The court 
allowed the statement and ruled prospectively allowing admission 
of actual testimony concerning the conversation. 
The Court: Motion is denied. Bring the jury back in. Stay 
away from the California Trip except only as to the 
conversation. 
Tr. at 91. 
In this ruling the trial court allowed the State to go into the 
conversation about the California trip. The only thing this 
ruling excluded was evidence about whether the trip actually took 
place. Objection was properly made by defense counsel, and 
overruled by the court. 
The testimony that the defendant was going to California to 
purchase illegal drugs was extremely prejudicial, had no 
probative value, and constituted reversible error. 
III. THE ORDER TO STRIKE DID NOT EXPUNGE THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT 
OF OFFICER TOMPKINS' REMARK. 
In its brief, the State argues that the trial court's order 
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to strike did away with any prejudice which could have been 
created by Officer Tompkins' remark. The remark is as follows: 
She [Palmasano] said that she had been trying to stay off 
from drugs for I believe she said two or three weeks. Donna 
was a friend of hers and knew this. That Donna was still 
using drugs and trying to get her to use drugs and that 
upset her. She also stated that she [defendant] was selling 
drugs to kids that were her kid's age. She [Palmasano] 
didn't think that was right. Basically those were the two 
main issues with Mrs. Palmasano. (Tr. May 4, 1994 at 135) . 
The State supports its argument that the order to strike expunged 
any prejudice by referring to State v. Archuletta, 850 P.2d 1242 
(Utah 1993) . In Archuletta', a witness unexpectedly made a 
statement that the defendant was wearing a knife scabbard on the 
night of the murder. Rather than granting a mistrial the trial 
court ordered the statement stricken. The court also stated that 
the statement was not credible. 
The Archuletta holding is not applicable in the case at bar. 
In Archuletta, the testimony about the knife was confusing to the 
jury at best. There was no supporting evidence that the 
defendant had a knife on the evening in question. The victim was 
not killed with a knife. All of the evidence regarding any use 
of a knife pointed to another defendant in the case. Also, in 
Archuletta the State had a very strong case. Which the State is 
lacking in the case at bar despite its arguments. 
In the case at bar, Officer Tompkins' statement was 
extremely prejudicial. The statement alleged without evidence of 
any kind that the defendant sold drugs on other occasions, and 
sold them to children. Without question such a statement is 
certain to raise the passions of a jury regardless of the Court's 
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subsequent instruction to strike the statement. Once uttered to 
the jury, the damage is done and the jury is infected with 
prejudice. 
The State argues that the defendant has provided no evidence 
to rebut the presumption that juries obey court instructions. 
Absent a voluntary statement from a juror such evidence is 
impossible to obtain. Arguably, reality is that a direction to 
the jury to strike a statement which is frequently then repeated, 
only serves to effectively emphasize improper evidence to the 
jury rather than cause them to ignore a statement which has 
already prejudiced their view. People passionately dislike 
defendants who allegedly sell drugs to children. 
IV. THE IMPROPER REFERENCE TO THE TRANSCRIPT OF A TAPE 
CONSTITUTED A PREJUDICIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATION. 
In its brief the State argues that reference to the 
transcript of the tape constituted neither a discovery violation 
nor reversible error. The reference to the transcript is a 
violation of the discovery request. 
Before trial the State received a request for discovery 
pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
State voluntarily complied. R. at 11. Defense counsel later 
confirmed by fax and telephone that no tapes were to be used. 
Tr. at 150. Copies of the transcript were handed out to counsel 
just prior to the lunch break. Tr. at 150. 
The nondisclosure of the tapes and transcript occurred 
despite the fact that a Rule 16 motion would have required full 
disclosure of the materials. Tr. at 150. Regarding 
6 
nondisclosure of materials in a voluntary response to a request 
for discovery the Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
. . . However, when the prosecution chooses to respond 
voluntarily to a request under subsection (a)(5) without 
requiring the defense to obtain a court order, 
considerations of fairness require that the prosecution 
respond to the request in a manner that will not be 
misleading. Therefore, we articulate two requirements that 
the prosecution must meet when it responds voluntarily to a 
request for discovery, First, the prosecution either must 
produce all of the material requested or must identify 
explicitly those portions of the request with respect to 
which no responsive material will be provided. Second, when 
the prosecution agrees to produce any of the material 
requested, it must continue to disclose such material on an 
ongoing basis to the defense. Therefore, if the prosecution 
agrees to produce certain specified material and it later 
comes into possession of additional material that falls 
within that same specification, it has to produce the after-
acquired material. 
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987). 
The trial court recognized that the reference to the 
transcript and tape constituted a discovery violation which was 
prejudicial to the defendant. Tr. at 153. 
The State's argument that the reference to the tape and 
transcript was not harmful or prejudicial is incorrect. Because 
the tape and transcript were raised before the jury and not 
stricken, the jury was left to speculate on their content. This 
is especially harmful because the officer did not hear a drug 
transaction on the tape. Tr. at 151. The jury was left to 
speculate on the content of a conversation which was never heard. 
Where there are wrongful discovery violations the State has 
the burden of proving that the violation as not prejudicial. 
In State v. Knight, the Court stated: 
Because of the difficulties posed by the record's silence in 
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cases involving a wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory 
evidence, it seems appropriate in such instances to place 
the burden on the State to persuade a court that the error 
did not unfairly prejudice the defense. Therefore when the 
defendant can make a credible argument that the prosecutor's 
errors have impaired the defense, it is up to the State to 
persuade the court that there is no reasonable likelihood 
that absent the error, the outcome of trial would have been 
more favorable for the defendant. 
734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987). 
Under this standard set forth in Knight, the State has the burden 
of persuading the court that there was no prejudice. If this 
were a strong case based on credible witnesses supported by a 
tape of the alleged drug transaction, the State would have no 
difficulty in meeting its burden. In the case at bar, the State 
cannot demonstrate that the error was not prejudicial, and 
reversal is, therefore, warranted. 
V. MELVA PALMASANO'S INCORRECT STATEMENT THAT DEFENDANT HAD 
PREVIOUSLY BEEN ARRESTED FOR SELLING DRUGS IS PREJUDICIAL 
AND HARMFUL. 
During Direct examination, Melva Palmasano testified that 
defendant and her husband had all been charged with selling drugs 
previously, and that defendant and her husband were continuing to 
sell. Tr. at 196-197. There was also an inference that 
defendant and her husband had previously been arrested. Tr. at 
196-197. This statement, besides being prejudicial, was untrue 
as defendant had never previously been arrested. Tr. at 197. 
The State argues that this was simply an inadvertent 
comment, harmless when compared with the overall strength of the 
State's case. Despite the State's repeated argument, the case 
was not strong. It is based solely on the testimony of an 
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admitted drug dealer who was not searched prior to the alleged 
transaction. The officers monitoring the alleged transaction did 
not hear a drug deal. In light of these and the other weaknesses 
set forth above, the position that this is a strong case is mere 
puffing. 
In its brief, the State does not argue that this statement 
was not prejudicial, only that it was not harmful. The prejudice 
must, therefore, be presumed. The issue before the court is 
whether the errors were harmful. Harmless errors are properly 
preserved and challenged errors that "are sufficiently 
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." State v. Verde, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 39 (Utah 
1989) . 
In many ways this case is similar to State v. Emmett, 83 9 
P.2d 781 (Utah 1992). In Emmett, there were multiple errors, and 
a conviction based on the testimony of a single witness with 
questionable reliability. Regarding the errors which occurred in 
that case the Court stated: 
Alone, this error may have been harmless. However, viewed 
in conjunction with the prosecutor's improper argument, the 
fact that the evidence in favor of guilt was not strong, and 
the fact that these errors impacted Emmett's credibility and 
character, which were at the heart of his defense -- there 
is a reasonable likelihood that absent the errors a 
different result would have occurred. We therefore decline 
to accept the reasoning of the trial court that it was led 
into error by defense counsel's choice of trial strategy or 
that the error was simply harmless. Rather, we conclude 
that the error was of sufficient magnitude as to warrant a 
new trial. 
839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992). 
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Like Emmett, the irregularities in this case require reversal and 
remand. 
CONCLUSION 
Examination of the record clearly demonstrates that the 
State's case at trial was based entirely on the testimony of an 
unreliable witness. This witness had the motive and the 
opportunity to fabricate the case against defendant. 
In this matter there were four separate incidents of error, 
and for motions for mistrial were argued and denied by the trial 
judge. Each incident alone was sufficiently prejudicial to 
require reversal. Cumulatively, the effect of the errors 
undermines any confidence in the verdict and therefore requires 
reversal and remand. 
DATED this 34^ day of Jun<3, 1995. 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND, P.C. 
BY: 
DONALD E. McCAND&£§. 
THOMAS J. SCRIBNER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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